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La Mauvaise Qualité de la Loi: 
Vagueness Doctrine at the French 
Constitutional Council 
by PA TRICIA RRAPI* 
Introduction 
Statutes, the United States Supreme Court asserts, should mean 
what they say. Yet, in reality, no one would be surprised to learn that 
statutes do not often say what they mean. Not only are vague laws 
widely found, but statutory vagueness cornes in many diff erent forms.
1 
In France, vagueness of statutes has drawn judges' and scholars' 
attention over the last ten years. The doctrinal literature on this issue 
is abundant. Sounding the alarm, this literature invites judges and 
politicians to find remedies for what is generally named as the 
"disease" of our democracy.
2 
In response, the French Constitutional 
Council, since 1998, has been trying to generate a "quality of law" 
doctrine in its cases in order to improve citizens' accessibility to the 
law. The doctrine, however, remains under-developed compared to 
its counterpart in the United States. 
Vagueness-of-law concerns seem to be well known in the United 
States, at least since the Supreme Court invoked the vagueness 
• Fellow, Institut Louis-Favoreu, Université Paul Cézanne, Aix-Marseille III,
France; Visiting Scholar, Loyola Law School. I am indebted to Professor Karl Manheim 
for reading the article, helping with the U.S. constitutional law, and for discussing and 
analyzing the framework. I am also indebted to Professor Aaron Capian for helpful 
explanations of the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment cases. 
1. Keith Culver, Varieties of Vagueness, 54 U. TORONTO L. J. 109 (2004). See also
TIMOTHY A.0. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (Oxford Univ. Press) (2001). 
2. BERTRAND MATHIEU, LA LOI (2nd ed. 2006). See also Pierre de Montalivet, La
"Juridicisation" de la Légistique. À Propos de !'Objectif de Valeur Constitutionnelle 
d'Accessibilité et d'intelligibilité de la Loi, in LA CONFECTION DE LA LOI, 99 (Presses 
Universitaries de France.) (2005); Patrick Wachsmann, Sur la Qualité de la Loi, reprinted 
in MÉLANGES: PAUL AMSELEK, 809 (Emile Bruylant ed., 2005). 
doctrine for the first time in 1875.
3 
The case law here is abundant and 
covers a wide variety of situations. Therefore, a comparative study of 
these two doctrines, French and American, may lead to new 
understandings of the subject, at least for French jurists. As it will be 
discussed, the French Constitutional Council has to learn a lot from 
the American vagueness doctrine. On the other band, U.S. 
constitutional law will become familiar with new concepts, such as 
intelligibility or accessibility of statutes. The U.S. Supreme Court 
develops these notions in a different way. The purpose of this article 
is to emphasize the necessary communication between these two 
doctrines. 
Vagueness is not an issue unique to the law; it also has political 
and philosophical dimensions. Without approaching these theoretical 
aspects of vagueness, this comparative study of French and American 
doctrines aspires simply to provide an overview of French and 
American case law. Yet, comparative analyses are problematic. lt is 
not only that the French quality of law doctrine has yet to mature to 
that of its American counterpart, but dissimilarities in respective 
systems of judicial review complicate in-depth comparisons. Even if 
the purpose of these two doctrines were the same-providing 
constitutional rules on vagueness-American and French cases in 
which statutes are challenged for vagueness are materially different. 
Therefore, not only does the reasoning behind these two doctrines 
differ, but remedies provided by American and French judges to 
vague laws must also be considered within the confines of their 
respective legal systems. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that "federal courts have the 
power to adopt narrowing constructions of federal legislation. 
Indeed, the federal courts have the duty to avoid constitutional 
difficulties by doing so if such construction is fairly possible."
4 
Andrew Goldsmith calls this remedy "judicial interpretation 
narrow[ing the] statute. "
5 
After j udicial narrowing, the off en ding 
provision is no longer unconstitutionally vague. In France, the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council is invoked before a statute 
is signed into law, by the President of the Republic, and subsequently 
enforced. The Council is, in effect, a "council of revision," as the 
concept was described, and rejected, at the American constitutional 
3. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void for
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279,280 n.1 (2003). 
4. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330-31 (1988) (citation omitted).
5. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 295.
convention in 1787.
6 
Accordingly, the Council cannot know how 
courts will interpret the law in application, even if in some cases the 
Council provides its own interpretation (reserves d'interprétation). 
Therefore, the first part of this article provides a summary of the 
main distinctions between French and American judicial review. In 
the second part, I analyze French case law in order to bring out a 
comparison to the American vagueness doctrine, which is described 
in the third part. The last part concerns the rise of a French "quality 
of law" doctrine through the new procedure of "preliminary 
question." This procedure will give the Constitutional Council 
jurisdiction to review constitutional matters in actual cases.7 lt is this 
new feature of judicial review in France that makes comparison to 
American constitutional law so vital. Although the United States has 
known concrete judicial review since Marbury v. Madison,8 this 
element of democratic institutions is new to France.
9 
We have a lot to 
learn from our American cousins. 
I. Judicial Review in France and the United States
A. The Constitutional Council
1. Creation, Composition, and Functions in the French Constitutional
System
The Constitutional Council was created in 1958 and became the
first institution under the French system vested with the power of 
judicial review. From 1790 to 1958, the French constitutional system 
not only ignored and prohibited judicial review but also criticized the 
6. Resolution 8 of the original Virginia Plan contained the proposai for the national
Council of Revision. It was officially submitted to the Convention on May 29, 1787. 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., Yale 
Univ. Press 1911) (It was proposed "that the Executive and a convenient number of the 
National Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every 
act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular 
Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said 
Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the National Legislature be again 
passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by [] of the members of each 
branch."); see James T. Barry, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 248 (1989). Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court refers to the 
Framers' intent to limit courts' power by rejecting the Council of Revision. See United 
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,555 (1999). 
7. See André Roux, Le Nouveau Conseil constitutionnel? Vers la fin de l'exception
française, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE [JCP] 2008, l, no. 175 (Fr.). 
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. LOUIS FAVOREU & LOÏC PHILIP, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (7th ed. 2005).
rule that the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Marbury. 10 The 
specter of "the government of judges,"u as observed by French 
scholars in the American system, was thought to be against the 
principle of the separation of powers.12 Allowing judges to review the 
law-an expression of general will13-was perceived as a violation of 
legislative sovereignty.14 
Only after World War II did France, along with other European 
countries, conceive a special constitutional body detached from the 
regular and administrative judiciary.15 Embracing uniquely European 
forms of review, the French system of judicial review is a compromise 
between a long tradition of hostility and rejection of any form of 
judicial review and the necessity of some mechanism to protect the 
supremacy of the constitution. Therefore, the Constitutional Council, 
as inspired by Hans Kelsen,16 is the prototype of the European 
"model" of "constitutional review."17 
The Constitutional Council is a constitutional body composed of 
nine members appointed by the President of the Republic and the 
10. See Michel Troper, Séparation des Pouvoirs, in DICTIONNAIRE DE PHILOSOPHIE
POLITIQUE 708 {Phillippe Raynaud & Stephanie Rials eds., Presses Universitaires de 
France 2003). See also Michel Troper, La Notion de Pouvoir Judiciaire au Début de la 
Révolution Française, in 1791 LA PREMIÈRE CONSTITUTION FRANÇAISE, at 355 (1993). 
11. EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUTTE CONTRE
LA LÉGISLATION SOCIALE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS {Marcel Girard ed., 1921). 
12. Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review And Why it
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REY. 2744 {2002). 
13. The term "general will" is inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 
St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762). His theory of the "general will" bas been, since the 
French Revolution, at the core of French constitutional theory. Therefore, Article 6 of the 
Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789 states, "The Law is the 
expression of the general will." Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 
1789, art. 6 (1789) (Fr.). 
14. The French Revolution produced a separation of powers doctrine that rigidly
confined judicial authority. From the perspective of French separation of powers 
orthodoxy, the judicial branch was not only a negligent one but the judicial review was 
also thought to lead to a confusion of powers. See also Michel Troper, LA SEPARATION 
DES POUVOIRS ET L'HISTOIRE CONSTITUTIONNELLE FRANÇAISE {1973). 
15. FAVOREU & PHILIP, supra note 9.
16. The modern European constitutional court is the invention of Hans Kelsen. In
his article, La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution, 45 REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC 
[R.D.D.P.) 197 {1928) (Fr.)., he proposed a particular judicial review, different from the 
American one. In order to avoid arguments against the judicial review, he imagined a 
special constitutional body. For further explanations, see ALEC STONE SWEET, 
GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTION AL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000). 
17. See LOUIS FAVOREU, LES COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES {3d ed., Presses
Universitaires de France 2000) {1996). 
Presidents of each House of Parliament.
18 
Under Article 61 of the 
Constitution of 1958, the Constitutional Council exercises a priori, 
abstract review exclusively and solely upon referral by political 
authorities.
19 
The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the 
President of the National Assembly, the President of the Serrate, sixty 
Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators may refer Acts 
of Parliament to the Constitutional Council before their 
promulgation.20 Until recently, there has been no other avenue for 
review by the Council.
21
Under Article 62 of the Constitution, "a provision declared 
unconstitutional on the basis of Article 61 shall be neither 
promulgated nor implemented."22 Article 61 states further: "no 
appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Constitutional Council.
23 
They shall be binding on public authorities and on all administrative 
authorities and all courts."
24 
This article provides Constitutional 
Council rulings with the authority inherent to judicial decisions.
25 
Concrete review is forbidden; once promulgated, laws are immune 
from scrutiny by the Council or by any other jurisdiction. Thus, the 
Constitutional Council does not hear "cases and controversies," 
which is the full extent of U.S. federal jurisdiction.
26 
2. Comparison of Judicial Review in France and the United States
Abstract review differs from judicial review principally in that it
is neither dependent on nor incidental to concrete litigation or 
18. 1958 Coust. art. 56 (Fr.).
19. 1958 Coust. art. 61 (Fr.) ("Acts of Parliament may be referred to the
Constitutional Council, before they promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the 
Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of Senate, sixty 
Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators."). 
20. In 1974, the French Constitution was amended and the new ruling vested standing
in sixty members of the political minority in either the Senate or the National Assembly to 
challenge the constitutionality of an act. On the contrary the U.S. Supreme Court has 
always refused standing to political minorities. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
21. The new procedure of "question préjudicielle" is discussed later in this article.
22. 1958 CONST. art. 62 (Fr.).
23. 1958 CONST. art. 61 (Fr.).
24. Id.
25. Louis Favoreu, La Décision de Constitutionnalité, 38 Revue Internationale de
Droit Comparé [R.l.D.C.] 611, 611---633 (1986). See also Jacques Robert, Louis Favoreu, 
Francisco Rubio Llorente & Alessandro Pizzorusso, L'Autorité de Chose Jugée des 
Décisions des Juridictions Constitutionnelles, 265-282 (1995). 
26. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
controversy involving a statute.
27 
The abstract review process results 
"in a ruling on the prima facie constitutionality of a legislative text; a 
concrete 'case or controversy' is not a requisite condition."
28 
Alec 
Stone observed that the abstract review is a purely exegetical exercise 
since it takes place outside of the tenets of the judicial paradigm.
29 
The judicial paradigm refers to Martin Shapiro's analysis of 
courts on the "social logic" of triadic conflict involving two persons in 
conflict and a third person called to assist in achieving a solution.
30 
Therefore, he emphasized that in terms of judicial paradigm, the 
Council's role in the French political system is much more legislative 
than judicial.
31 
The "judicial paradigm," even in a concrete judicial review, does 
not permit a sufficient analysis of constitutional law challenges since 
these issues miss narrowly political questions.
32 
Indeed, when judges 
are invited to challenge the constitutionality of a statute they often 
participate in the law-making process itself and affront directly the 
legislative power. Therefore, they do not often behave as a "neutral 
third party."
33 
But abstract constitutional review seems to be even 
further removed from triadic resolution than is judicial review.
34 
Therefore, Constitutional Council cases and their rulings seem only to 
complete the law-making process. These cases, and the example of 
quality of law doctrine, do not always guide us by concrete and 
precise judicial reasoning. This does not mean that the Constitutional 
Council fails to give judicial answers to constitutional law challenges.
35 
27. Louis Favoreu, Modèle Américain et Modèle Européen de Justice Constitutionnelle
[The American Mode) and the European Mode) of Constitutional Justice], 4 ANNUAIRE 
INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE [A.l.J.C.] 57 {1988) {Fr.). 
28. ALEC STONE SWEET, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE
CONSTITUTION AL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). 
29. Id.
30. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1-2
{Univ. of Chi. Press 1981). 
31. STONE, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Alec Stone, The Birth and the Development of Abstract Review in Western
Europe: Constitutional Courts and Policy-Making in Western Europe, 19 POL'Y STUD. J. 
81, 81-95 (1990). 
35. Louis Favoreu's writings proved that the Constitutional Council's activities are
judicial and not political. See LOUIS FAVOREU, LA POLITIQUE SAISIE PAR LE DROIT 
(1988); see also LOUIS FAVOREU, ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (2008); LOUIS 
FAVOREU & LOÏC PHILIP, GRANDES DÉCISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (7th 
lt does mean, however, that the French Constitutional Council and 
U .S. Supreme Court play different roles in their respective countries. 
This article explores how these courts pursue similar purposes 
through different jurisprudential means. As a result, this comparative 
study of French and American vagueness doctrine seeks only to give 
two different approaches to the same issue, even if the purpose of the 
doctrines is the same in both cases. 
Indeed, its role in abstract judicial review does not permit the 
Constitutional Council to provide a concrete meaning of its quality of 
law doctrine, whereas the Supreme Court is able in a concrete case to 
ameliorate the vagueness of a statute as it is applied to citizens.
36 
This 
is true even in "facial" challenges before American courts, where the 
precise facts of a given controversy often do not factor into the 
analysis.
37 
Facial challenges still must meet "case and controversy" 
requirements and the case must be ripe for adjudication. That is far 
different from the European "abstract review of legislation" which 
refers to "the review of a statute's constitutionality prior to its 
application or enforcement. "
38 
There are real and adverse litigants in 
facial cases, unlike the a priori review of the Constitutional Council. 
Facts in the former may not be dispositive, but can still illuminate the 
controversy. Facts in the latter are hypothetical at best. 
Thus, while there are similarities between French and American 
constitutional review in facial cases, the difference between abstract 
review and real controversies remains important in understanding the 
different development of French and American vagueness doctrines. 
Yet, as judicial review in France moves ever more closely to its 
American counterpart, this comparative study may be helpful in some 
manner as the Constitutional Council further develops its vagueness 
doctrine. 
3. Quality of Law Under the French Constitution
For the Constitutional Council, a statute is vague when it is not
"intelligible" or not "accessible."
39 
These two principles are two 
ed. 2005); Burt Neuborne, ln Honor of late Louis Favoreu: France Exceptionalism in 
Constitutional Law, 5 INT'LJ. CONST. L.17 (2007). 
36. Still, the Supreme Court accepts facial challenges in vagueness cases. Differences
between "facial" challenges and "abstract review" will be discussed later in this article. 
37. See also infra note 105.
38. See Stone, supra note 12, at 2772.
39. Still "vagueness" seems to be different from "intelligibility" and "accessibility."
Vagueness is a Jack of distinctness or preciseness. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3538 
(compact ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1976). The French word "vague" has the same meaning 
complimentary components of the quality of law doctrine. 
Constitutional grounds for this scrutiny are the individual rights 
provisions of Articles 4, 5, 6, and 16 of the Declaration of Human and 
Civic Rights, adopted during the French Revolution in 1789.
40 
Because of these several grounds, the quality of law test does not 
give a very precise definition of the principle of intelligibility and 
accessibility of law. Cases in which the Constitutional Council has 
been asked to review the constitutionality of the law because of its 
vagueness are rare. Moreover, these cases do not take a significant 
role in individual rights' protection as do the U.S. Supreme Court 
cases. Therefore the quality of law doctrine, in its current form, looks 
feeble compared to the vagueness doctrine under U.S. constitutional 
law. 
Cases in which the Constitutional Council has invalidated a law 
because of its vagueness are also rare. Yet, there are some cases in 
which the constitutional judge, without challenging the 
constitutionality of the referred statute, more fully explicates the 
quality of law doctrine. 
(que l'esprit a du mal à saisir a cause de son caractère mouvant et de son sens mal défini, 
mal établi. LE PETIT ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRES LE ROBERT 2634 (2000). "Intelligible," 
both in English and in French means "capable of being understood" or "comprehensible" 
and "accessibility" stands for the quality of "being accessible or of admitting approach." 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1456 (compact ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1976)); LE PETIT 
ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRES LE ROBERT 1336 (2000). Vagueness concerns borderline cases 
that a statute may or not include, whereas "intelligibility" and "accessibility" refer to the 
meaning of the statute itself. In that sense, the Constitutional Council has not exactly 
dealt with vague constitutional challenges. Moreover, in an abstract review it cannot 
really foresee "borderline cases." But for the purposes of the comparison and since both 
the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court provide similar prongs for their 
respective doctrines, these two constitutional requirements will be considered as 
analogous. 
40. Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789, art. 4 (1789) (Fr.)
("Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others: thus, the 
exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds other than those that ensure to 
other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. Only Law may determine 
these bounds."); id. at art. 5 ("The Law has the right to forbid only those actions that are 
injurious to society. Nothing that is not forbidden by Law may be hindered; and no one 
may be compelled to do what the Law does not ordain."); id. at art. 6 ("The law is the 
expression of the general will. Ail citizens have the right to take part, personally or 
through their representatives, in its making. It must be the same for ail, whether it protects 
or punishes. Ali citizens, being equal in its eyes, shall de equally eligible to ail High offices, 
public positions and employments, according to their ability, and without other distinction 
than that of their virtues and talents."); id. at art. 16 ("Any society in which no provision is 
made for guaranteeing rights or for the separation of powers, has no Constitution."). 
4. The Principle of Intelligibility and Accessibility of Law
The quality of law doctrine is a recent theoretical construct. The
Constitutional Council distinguishes two facets that the quality of law 
requires: intelligibility and accessibility of law. 
First, the constitutional requirement for accessibility of law 
seems to provide the citizen with material access to the law in respect 
to the principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense.
41 
Therefore, the principle of accessibility means that the law should be 
published in a sufficient way ( official journal) and that its 
presentation should be clear. The other facet concerns the content of 
the law. Indeed, the principle of intelligibility seems to refer more to 
the clarity of law and to the ability for the citizens to reach the 
meaning of the law. Initially, the Constitutional Council tried to 
distinguish the principle of clarity of law from the principle of 
intelligibility and accessibility of law. The Constitutional Council for 
the first time in 1998 invoked the principle of clarity of law.42 In 1999 
it invoked the comparable principle of intelligibility and accessibility 
of law.
43 
After being criticized for having separated the clarity of law from 
the intelligibility of law, the Constitutional Council abandoned the 
principle of clarity.
44 
The principle of clarity was thought to provide 
an objective standard of "common understanding" whereas the 
principle of intelligibility and accessibility furnished a subjective 
appreciation of the same standard. 
The ground for the principle of clarity of law was different from 
the ground for intelligibility and accessibility of law. Indeed, between 
1999 and 2004 the Constitutional Council held that the principle of 
clarity of law was derived from Article 34 of the Constitution of 1958, 
which enumerates Parliament's powers rather than the rights 
provisions in the 1789 Declaration.
45 
These two principles did not bind the legislature in the same way. 
Whereas the principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law is only 
"un objectif à valeur constitutionnelle" ( constitutional status ), which 
means that this principle is only a constitutional goal that the 
41. Laure Milano, Contrôle de Constitutionnalité et Qualité de la Loi, 3 REVUE DU
DROIT PUBLIC [R.D.D.P.] 637 (2006); see also de Montalivet, supra note 2. 
42. CC decision no. 98-401DC, June 10, 1998, Rec. 258.
43. CC decision no. 99-421DC, Dec. 16, 1999, Rec. 136.
44. Milano, supra note 41, at 645.
45. CC decision no. 98-401DC, supra note 42. See also CC decision no. 2001-455DC,
Jan. 12, 2002, Rec. 49. 
legislator must try to achieve ( obligation of means ), the second 
principle puts a stronger obligation on the legislature ( obligation of 
result).
46 Many commentators found this distinction difficult to 
1 
• 47 
exp am.
The French Constitutional Council, however, tried by using these 
two different principles, and after 2004, by using only the principle of 
accessibility and intelligibility of law to set a standard (probably an 
objective one, as we will see later) which permits one to measure the 
understandability of law. The Constitutional Council held that: 
The equality before the law laid down by Article 6 of the 
Declaration of Human and Civic rights of 1789 ("DHCR") and 
the "guarantee of rights" required by Article 16 may not be 
effective if the citizens do not have sufficient knowledge of the 
statutes that apply to them, that such knowledge is also necessary 
for the exercise of rights and freedoms as guaranteed by Article 
4 of the Declaration (Natural rights have no bounds other than 
those that ensure to the other members of society the 
enjoyment of these same rights. Only Law may determine these 
bounds) and by Article 5 of the same Declaration (nothing that 
is not forbidden by Law may be hindered, and no one may be 
compelled to do what the Law does not ordain).
48 
The Council usually repeats this paragraph ( considérant de 
principe) in cases involving intelligibility and accessibility challenges. 
The object is to impose on the legislature a requirement that its laws 
be readily available and comprehensible by citizens so as to protect 
their rights. 
B. Cases Raising the Quality of Law Doctrine
1. 1998: Future lmplementation of Law
In the case Act Reducing Working Hours, Members of the
National Assembly and Senators challenged a controversial law that 
reduced working hours.
49 
Even though the law passed in 1998, its 
enforcement was deferred until 2000 and 2002. The parties making 
the referral to the Constitutional Council argued that by deferring its 
46. Milano, supra note 41, at 646.
47. Bertrand Mathieu & Michel Verpeaux, Chronique Constitutionnelle, 19 LES
PETITES AFFICHES 16 (2002) (Fr.). 
48. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
49. CC decision no. 98-401DC, supra note 42.
effective date until after a government report was issued, the law was 
unconstitutionally vague.50 They further argued that Parliament 
abdicated its power (incompetence negative) by deferring until a 
future time.
51 According to this argument, if Parliament refers a law 
to a future report (and therefore uncertain content), the precise 
implementation of law is unknown when the statute is passed.52 The 
Constitutional Council evaluated the argument, but held that the 
challenged law was sufficiently clear for constitutional purposes.53 
Parliament could defer the implementation of a law without it failing 
for lack of clarity.54 
This case concerned the clarity of law doctrine, which was 
abandoned in later cases. The clarity of law doctrine is different from 
the principles of intelligibility and accessibility of law, and it is linked 
to the American "non-delegation" doctrine, which will be discussed 
later in this article. Yet, it is important to mention this case since it is 
the first case in which the Council expressed its concerns about the 
quality of law.55
2. 1999: Codification of Law
In the case Act Authorizing the Government to Codify, by
Ordinance, the Legislative Volume of Severa! Codes,56 Parliament 
delegated its power under Article 38 of the Constitution57 in order to 
allow the Government to undertake the codification of the law.58 
Article 38, as interpreted by the Constitutional Council, requires that 
the purpose of the delegation of legislative power should be precisely 
defined and has to be justified by some urgency.59 The parties making 
the referral to the Constitutional Council argued that Article 38 of 
the Constitution was violated since the legislature did not observe 
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See 5 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 11 (1998).
55. Milano, supra note 41, at 640.
56. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
57. 1958 CONST. art. 38 ("In order to implement its program, the Government may
ask Parliament for authorization, for a limited period, to take measures by Ordinance that 
are normally the preserve of statute law."). 
58. Indeed, French statu tes are grouped together in Codes. Each of these codes deals
with a particular subject: Criminal Code, General Tax Code, Civil Code, etc. 
59. CC decision no. 76-72DC, January 12, 1977, Rec. 343.
these two requirements.
60 
The Constitutional Council held that the 
principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law which are 
constitutionally required and which Parliament was trying to 
accomplish through the challenged delegation, could justify the 
urgency requirement under Article 38 of the Constitution.
61
This case provides precision for the principle of accessibility of 
law. The Council said that the codification of statutes could improve 
citizens' access to the law.
62 
Since the codification improves access, 
the principle of accessibility of law itself includes the requirement that 
the statute be carefully presented.
63 
Among other quality of law problems that have been raised in 
France over the past ten years, the overproduction of legislation is 
indisputably the most alarming.
64 
Yet, the Constitutional Council as a 
judge cannot control the quantity of statutes, since it concerns 
Parliament's activity as a political body. But, the Council uses the 
principle of accessibility as an indirect tool in order to provide relief 
from the huge quantity of statutes. Since Parliament cannot help but 
pass a large quantity of statu tes, it still has to present them carefully. 
3. 2003: Election of Senators
Provision 7 of the Senators Election Act (Article L. 52-3 of
Election Code) reads in part: 
For each category of election, the wording and the font size of 
ballots must be in accordance with laws and regulations- for 
elections "au scrutin majoritaire" (election by majority vote), 
the ballots may not include any name other than the proper 
name of the candidate- for elections "au scrutin de liste" (list­
system), the lists presented in each of the departmental or 
regional constituency can take a single name in order to be 
identified at the national level. This could be the name of a 
group or political party or their representatives.
65 
60. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
61. See 8 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 20 (2000).
62. CC decision no. 99-421DC, supra note 43.
63. Milano, supra note 41, at 643; see also de Montalivet, supra note 2.
64. Svein Eng, Legislative Inflation and the Quality of Law, in LEGISPRUDENCE : A
NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH TO LEGISLATION 65, 65-79 (Luc Wintgens ed., 2003). 
65. CC decision no. 2003-475DC, July 24, 2003, Rec. 397.
The parties making the referral to the Constitutional Council 
submitted that the changes to the Senators' elections were not 
"directly related" to the provision of that bill.66
The Constitutional Council ruled that Parliament intended to 
regulate Senators' election, but Article L. 52-3 is in Title I of Book I 
of Electoral Code, a Title that is not related to Senators' election.6
7 
Therefore, Provision 7 of the Senators' Election Act, was 
unconstitutionally inaccessible.
68 The Constitutional Council 
explained that this Provision could modify existing legislation only 
when related to Senators' elections.6
9 
lt held that Provision 7 lacked a 
relationship with the Senators' Election Act.
70 
Moreover, the Constitutional Council held that words such as 
"proper name" and "representative of a group or political party" are 
ambiguous. Indeed, the last paragraph of Article L. 52-3 allows, in 
some cases (involving lists of candidates), the inclusion on the ballot 
of names of people who are not themselves candidates for election 
(the list sponsors). Such inclusion, however, might create confusion 
in the minds of voters.
71 
Therefore it held that the statute was
unconstitutionally unintelligible.72 
This case provides a particular example of unintelligible statutes. 
The Constitutional Council seems to distinguish cases in which 
statutes are drafted in "ambiguous" terms. Not only citizens are 
unable to understand the statute, but "ambiguous" words also create 
confusion in the minds of voters. "Ambiguity" of a statu te raises an 
issue different from "unintelligibility." An intelligible statute can still 
be ambiguous if it is written in terms susceptible to several 
meanings.
73 
However, the Council does not provide a separate
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See 15 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 75 (2003).
71. Id.
72. Id. 
73. ENDICOTT, supra note 1, at 54. Both in English and French the word
"ambiguous" means that a statement is understandable but has two or more meanings. 
For the French word, LE PETIT ROBERT gives the following definition: "qui présente deux 
ou plusieurs sens possible, dont l'interprétation est incertaine." LE PETIT ROBERT, 
DICTIONNAIRES LE ROBERT 76 (2000). For the English word, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY gives the following definition: "admitting more than one interpretation or 
explanation; of double meaning, or of several possible meanings; equivocal." OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 143 (compact ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1976). Therefore, 
"ambiguity" and "unintelligibility" are two different problems. 
ambiguity doctrine. In this case it held that the statute was 
unconstitutionally unintelligible since it was written in ambiguous 
terms. 
4. Local Autonomy
Article 72-2 of the Constitution guarantees financial autonomy to
French territories.7
4 
Article 72-2 states that the "tax revenue and
other own revenue of territorial communities shall, for each category 
of territorial community, represent a decisive share of their 
revenue."
75 
In 2004, the Institutional Act that was to determine the 
conditions for implementation of this rule was referred to the 
Constitutional Council. Provision 4 of the Act repeated Article 72-2 
of the Constitution, but without providing further details.
76 
It stated 
that the "decisive share" should respect two conditions: first it must 
guarantee local autonomy, and second it must observe a minimal 
threshold that the Parliament provided by referring to the level 
recorded during 2003.77 
The Constitutional Council held that: 
13. Parliament must exercise to the full the powers vested in it
by the Constitution and in particular by Article 34 thereof. The
full exercise of such powers, together with the principle of
clarity of law, which derives from the same Article and object of 
constitutional status that the law be intelligible and accessible,
which derives from Article 4, 5, 6 and 16 of the Declaration of 
1789, place it under a duty to enact provisions, which are
sufficiently precise and unequivocal. Protection must be
afforded to all from interpretations which run counter to the
Constitution or from the risk of arbitrary decisions, without
leaving it to courts of law or administrative authorities to
determine rules which the Constitution provides should be the
sole preserve of statutory law.7
8 
The Constitutional Council often uses similar paragraphs to 
introduce its quality of law doctrine in order to respond to the 
referral. lt then continues to discuss the case: "15. Two conditions 
set by Provision 4 of the Act referred are tautological and violate both 
74. CC decision no. 2004-500DC, July 29, 2004, Rec. 116.
75. 1958 CONST. art. 72-2 (Fr.).
76. CC decision no. 2004-500DC, supra note 74.
77. Id.
78. Id.
the principle of clarity of the law and the requirement of precision that 
Article 72-2 of the Constitution compels[.]"
79 
The Constitutional Council invalidated "tautological" provisions 
in this case . More than correcting statute drafting, it seems to watch 
over Parliament's absentmindednes�. The statute, the Council 
asserts, must consist of a useful scope. When the Constitution 
requires more precision, the statute has to provide them. Parliament 
cannot merely repeat what Articles of the Constitution have already 
said.80 
In the same line of cases the Council held that the statute should 
consist of "normative" dispositions. If Parliament drafts statutes that 
are only declaratory and do not consist of a useful scope, the Council 
is sometimes willing to strike down these provisions. In 2005, 
provision 7 of the Programming Act for the Future of the School was 
found unconstitutionally unintelligible and inaccessible since it did 
not set "normative" disposition.
81 
Provision 7 reads: 
[T]he aim of the school is the success of all students. The school
must recognize and promote all forms of intelligence in order to
enable students to develop their talents, depending on their
diversity. The school, under the authority of teachers and with
the support of parents, must permit each student to complete
the work required for the development of his intellectual and
manual abilities.
82 
The Council held that provision 7 described only the aim of the 
school without setting any legal obligation.83 Therefore, it violated 
the principle of accessibility and intelligibility of the law. Still, this 
provision is neither unintelligible nor inaccessible.84 The Council once 
again includes within the principle of accessibility and intelligibility of 
law different aspects of poorly drafted statutes. Statutes lacking in a 
useful scope are far different from unintelligible provisions. 
Moreover the Council did not explain how a "declaratory" provision 
could obstruct citizens' accessibility to the law. One can easily realize 
79. Id.
80. See 17 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 62 (2004).
81. CC decision no. 2005-512DC, April 21, 2005, Rec. 72.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Veronique Champeil-Desplats, N'est pas Normative qui peut. L'Exigence
de Normativité dans la Jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, 21 LES CAHIERS DU 
CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 93 (2006). 
that the Council is not only trying to provide a constitutional 
requirement in order to improve citizens' accessibility to the law but 
it also regulates Parliament's statutory activity. 
5. 2005: Finance Act
The Finance Act for 2006
85 
was challenged for being
unintelligible and inaccessible. Members of the National Assembly 
and Senators argued that Provision 78 (Article 200-00 A of General 
Tax Code) of the statu te reached a level of such complexity that it 
became unintelligible to the citizen.
86 
This Provision introduced some 
tax benefits under the income tax law and enumerated different 
amounts of the benefits cap according to the composition of different 
households. 
The Constitutional Council held that the mechanism proposed by 
Article 200-00 A of General Tax Code did not respect the principle of 
equality since it could treat taxpayers differently in situations that 
were objectively identical.87 This followed directly from the criterion 
for the selection of households subject to the cap. Neither the statute 
nor Parliament's debate gave the definition for such distinction. 
Moreover, this provision was drafted in such a complicated way, by 
referring to other Articles of the General Tax Code and by providing 
an intricate calculation of the tax benefits, that the Constitutional 
Council found it unintelligible and inaccessible to the taxpayers.
88
Therefore, it held that this provision was vague and imprecise. 
Indeed, the Constitutional Council held that 
77. The equality before the law laid down by Article 6 of the
Declaration [of Rights] and the "guarantee of rights" protected
by Article 16 would not be effective if people do not have
sufficient knowledge of rules that are applicable to them and if
those rules were too complex in terms of the ability of citizens
to measure the useful scope. In particular the right to effective
redress before a court will be infringed. Also, this complexity
would restrict the exercise of rights and freedoms guaranteed
by Article 4 of the Declaration. These rights have no bounds
other than those that ensure to the other members of society
the enjoyment of these same rights. Only Law may determine
these bounds. This complexity would also restrict the exercise
85. CC decision no. 2005-530DC, Dec. 29, 2005, Rec. 168.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See 20 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 32 (2005).
of rights guaranteed by Article 5, under which nothing that is 
not forbidden by Law may be hindered, and no one may be 
compelled to do what the Law does not ordain.
89 
Here again the Constitutional Council introduces its reasoning 
by first providing constitutional grounds for the quality of law 
doctrine. Then, the Council diseuses the case: 
79. In this case, the tax law demands taxpayers to make choices
and determine the final amount of the tax according to different
options provided by the statute. The principle of equality
requires, however, that the citizen should be able to foresee to a
reasonable degree the amount of tax according to different
options that the statute opens to him;
80. However the complexity of the Law can be justified on the
grounds of sufficient general interest.'X)
This decision is reminiscent of due process principles underlying 
much of the U.S.'s vagueness doctrine.
91 
Every persan may be 
"presumed to know the law," but unless the law is known and 
knowable, the presumption fails. Still, some legal matters are 
unavoidably complex or imprecise. That alone does not create 
vagueness. Recognizing such limits on the fullness of language, the 
Constitutional Council noted in this case that there are statutes in 
which unintelligibility is permissible since they deal with complex 
problems. The example of the tax law is consonant with the Council's 
idea of a complex law. 
This excuse also shows the limits of the subjective standard of 
"common understanding" behind the quality of law doctrine. One 
can easily conclude that this excuse maintains the objective standard 
of common understanding. In this case, however, the Constitutional 
Council held the law to be unconstitutional since the complexity of 
provision 78 was excessive. lt suggested that it will examine whether 
the complexity of a statute can be justified by a sufficient general 
interest. Moreover the requirement of intelligibility is dependent 
upon the sensitivity of whom the law is directed.
92 
Therefore, the 
Council held that: 
89. CC decision no. 2005-530DC, supra note 85.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See discussion infra Part 11.C.
92. 20 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 32, 35 (2005).
82. Y et, in this case, Provision 28 is directed not only to the tax
administration, but also to taxpayers, who are required to
calculate in advance the amount of the tax;
84. Therefore the complexity of these rules results in the length
of provision 78 and in its imbricate drafting that it becomes
unintelligible for the taxpayer, and sometimes ambiguous for
the professional. This provision, as it referees to other Articles
of General Tax Code, would not insure the legal stability and
would lead to future misunderstandings, complaints and
litigations.
93 
The U .S. Supreme Court seems to accept the same argument 
when it says "there are areas of human conduct where, by the nature 
of the problems presented, legislatures cannot establish standards 
with great precision."
94 
In Smith v. Goguen, the Court wrote that a 
statute, such as one barring disorderly conduct, might require 
imprecise language, "requiring as it does an on-the-spot assessment of 
the need to keep the order. "
95 
Even if both French and American judges admit the same excuse 
for vagueness, their arguments are slightly different. First, these cases 
relate to different statutes (tax law for the Council and criminal law 
for the Court). 
Second, the Constitutional Council accepts the inability of the 
legislator to draft intelligible laws in complex areas whereas the 
Supreme Court points out the limits of the language to precisely 
define the meaning of the term that describes a human conduct. The 
Council accepts that sometimes statutes can be drafted in sufficiently 
precise terms but cannot help but be somewhat complicated. For the 
Supreme Court the "open texture" of some statutes cannot be 
sharpened to an unequivocal statement of what they require.
96 
C. 2008: Private Finance Initiative Act
The Constitutional Council invalidated proprio motu ( on its own
motion) provision 16 of The Private Finance Initiative Act ("PFI") on 
93. CC decision no. 2005-530DC, supra note 85.
94. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,581 (1974).
95. Id.
96. Culver, supra note l. "Open texture" of a statute means that the statute is 
susceptible of two or more interpretations. Id. Therefore, judges often have to interpret 
statutes. That does not necessarily mean that the statute is broad or vague. 
the grounds that it was unconstitutionally intelligible ( despite the fact 
that the Member of National Assembly and Senators in their referral 
did not challenge the Act on such ground).97 The Council found that 
this article had mentioned twice a superior threshold for PFI 
contracts, even though it had to set an inferior and a superior 
threshold.
98 The Council held that the legislature intended to define
two procedures, supposed alternatives, below and above a threshold, 
however. The article referred in both cases to the contracts whose 
amounts are "above the threshold."
99 
Since the legislator failed to 
draft the right words, it violated the principle of intelligibility and 
accessibility of the law. Therefore, the last two paragraphs of Article 
16 of the PFI Act were invalidated.100 
This case suggests that the Council will in the future strike down 
drafting errors. Moreover, the Constitutional Council challenges the 
provision of this statute proprio motu as it usually does in matters of 
public policies (ordre public). 
For the Supreme Court, a statute is vague "if it fails to provide a 
reasonable opportunity for people of ordinary intelligence to 
understand what conduct it prohibits" or "if it authorizes or even 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."101 The
Constitutional Council seems to provide similar prongs for its quality 
of law doctrine. 
II. The Supreme Court's Vagueness Cases
A. The First Amendment
Vagueness challenges can involve either a "facial" challenge to a
law or an "as applied" challenge. The "facial" challenge concerns a 
daim that a law is facially unconstitutional and should be struck down 
in its entirety.102 The "facial" challenge is controversial because the 
claimant before the court may not be arguing that a particular law is 
vague as to him, but may ask the court to strike down the law because 
97. CC decision no. 2008-567DC, July 24, 2008, Rec. 341.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1998).
102. RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 87-90 (2d ed. 2006). 
it is vague as applied to others.
103 
Therefore the Court has to consider
speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not 
before the court. 
One may see in "facial" challenges a review similar to the French 
constitutional review. Indeed, both the Constitutional Council and 
the Supreme Court in facial challenges deal with hypothetical cases, 
and both strike down statutes in their entirety. Nevertheless, the 
French Council does not exactly resolve hypothetical cases. lt 
confronts statutes with the Constitution and it is eut off from any 
concrete case. Therefore, its reasoning remains abstract. In dealing 
with a facial challenge, the Supreme Court hears a concrete case and 
has to give a precise reasoning even if at the same time it "resolves" 
hypothetical cases.
10
4 Yet, courts are generally reluctant to let
individuals assert the rights of others, and the Supreme Court has a 
very strict interpretation of standing rules. 10
5 
Vagueness doctrine
under the First Amendment is among these rare cases when the 
Supreme Court is willing to consider facial challenges. 
106 
The Supreme Court is inclined to apply the vagueness doctrine 
particularly when free speech is implicated. Cases in which statutes 
targeting Communists and establishing loyalty oaths were challenged 
103. Vagueness challenges are often combined with overbreadth daims. See, e.g.,
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1972). Laws restricting speech are overbroad when 
they suppress more speech than necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate goals. Laws 
suffering from overbreadth, just as vague laws, are often considered « on _their face. See 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971). 
104. Stone, supra note 12, at 2744. He argues that traditional differences of judicial
review in U.S. and Europe are in deep crises. Not only has European constitutional 
review become more concrete but also American judicial review has become increasingly 
abstract. In order to illustrate his point of view he explains two situations: the procedure 
of declaratory or injunctive relief and facial constitutional challenges. He further argues 
that these two situations are examples of an "abstract review" by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
even if American constitutional law does not use the term "abstract review." For our 
purposes, it still remains an important difference between facial challenges and abstract 
review. Abstract review is eut off from any concrete litigation. In declaratory or 
injunctive relief and in facial challenges judges have an idea of how the statute is being 
applied, which is never the case for the French Council. Moreover, invalidating a statute 
on its face does not necessarily mean that the review is abstract. For example, the new 
procedure of "question préjudicielle" grounds the Constitutional Council in concrete 
review activities but the Council still deals, in this case, with facial constitutional 
challenges. When the Council invalidates a statute, it is always on its face, even after this 
new procedure. Therefore, American facial constitutional challenges will look more like 
Constitutional Council cases' raised on the grounds of the preliminary question proccdure. 
105. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 419 (1975) (rejecting jus tertii standing for
injured parties). 
106. RUSSELL L. WEA VER & DONALD E. LiVEL Y, supra note 102.
on the grounds of vagueness are revealing of the Supreme Court's 
position.107 
In Baggett v. Bullit108 the Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he vice 
of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, 
the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise of individual 
freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution. We are dealing 
with indefinite statutes whose terms, even narrowly constructed, abut 
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms."109 In
Baggett, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a 1931 
Washington statute requiring teachers, as a condition of employment, 
to take a loyalty oath.110 The Supreme Court held that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.111 It ruled that the oath was lacking in 
"terms susceptible of objective measurement and failed to inform as 
to what the State commanded or forbade."112 The Supreme Court 
wrote, "Persons required to swear they understand this oath may 
quite reasonably conclude that any person who aids the Communist 
Party or teaches or advises known members of the Party is a 
subversive person because such teaching or advice may at some 
future date aid the activities of the Party."u3 Therefore, the statute 
did not provide an "ascertainable standard of conduct. "114 The
Supreme Court added, "the challenged oath is not open to one or a 
few interpretations, but to an indefinite number. "115 
Another case illustrates the risk of "arbitrary enforcement." It is 
usually affirmed that criminal statutes are subject to stricter 
vagueness analysis than civil statutes. Subject to an even stricter 
standard are criminal statutes that reach expression protected by the 
First Amendment. In Kolender v. Lawson,116 the Supreme Court 
invalidated a California statute requiring persons who loiter or 
wander on the streets to provide a "credible and reliable" 
identification. The Supreme Court held that: 
107. Id.
108. Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
109. Id. at 372.
110. Id. at 371.
111. Id. at 372.
112. Id. at 367 (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961)).
113. Id. at 368.
114. Id. at 372.
115. Id. at 378.
116. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1982). For the free assembly and association,
see Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1970). 
As presently drafted and construed by the state courts, the 
statute contains no standard for determining what a suspect has 
to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a "credible 
and reliable" identification. As such, the statute vests virtually 
complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine 
whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be 
permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to 
arrest.117 
Therefore the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it 
"encouraged arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with 
sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the 
statute."118 
ln some other cases the Supreme Court found that a statute 
violated both prongs of the vagueness test. In City of Chicago v. 
Morales,119 Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that an ordinance 
which required a police officer, "on observing a person whom he 
reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang member loitering in 
any public place with one or more other persons, to order all such 
persons to disperse, and made failure to obey such an order a 
violation," was unconstitutionally vague in falling to provide fair 
notice of prohibited conduct. 120 The ordinance was also impermissibly
vague in failing to establish "minimum guidelines for enforcement."121 
B. Prior Restraints
Another line of cases that concern the danger of arbitrary
decision in U.S. constitutional law is found in the prior restraint 
doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that a statute that gives 
"unfettered discretion" to government officiais to grant or withhold 
permits for speech in public places is tantamount to a "prior 
restraint." Prior restraints are generally forbidden m;ider the First 
Amendment. 
In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing,122 the Supreme 
Court held that a licensing statute that: 
117. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
118. Id. at 361.
119. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. at 60.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added).
122. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing, 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
(V]ests unbridled discretion in a government official over 
whether to permit or deny expressive activity ... constitutes a 
prior restraint and may result in censorship, engendering risks 
to free expression . . . The mere existence of the licensor's 
unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint, 
intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the 
discretion and power are never actually abused.
123 
In Lakewood, a newspaper company challenged the 
constitutionality of a city ordinance that regulated news racks on 
public sidewalks. That ordinance gave the mayor the authority to 
grant or deny applications for annual news rack permits.
124 
The 
Supreme Court held that "giving the mayor unfettered discretion to 
deny a permit application and to condition the permit on any 
additional terms he deems 'necessary and reasonable,' to be 
unconstitutional. "
125 
The ordinance was drafted in vague terms and failed to provide 
precise standards of conduct for authorities that had to enforce it. 
The Supreme Court said that the unfettered discretion given to the 
mayor could lead to arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance since one 
could not presume that the mayor would act in good faith and adhere 
to standards · that are not explicitly stated on the face of the 
ordinance.
126 
Therefore, the Court explained that the risk of arbitrary 
enforcement followed from the "unfettered discretion" given to the
mayor, which itself resulted from the statute's vagueness.
127
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the French Constitutional 
Council is rarely asked to resolve cases involving individual rights and 
quality of law issues. As the above First Amendment cases 
demonstrate, the U .S. Supreme Court is more concerned about the 
broadness of the law. The French Constitutional Council, by 
contrast, focuses on the complexity of the law. This is probably the 
123. Id. at 755-56.
124. If the mayor denied an application, he was required to "state the reasons for such
denial." Id. at 793 n.18. In the event the mayor grants an application, the city was asked 
to issue an annual permit subject to several terms and conditions. Among them were: (1) 
approval of the news rack design by the city's Architectural Board of Review; (2) an 
agreement by the news rack owner to indemnify the city against any liability arising from 
the news rack, guaranteed by a $100,000 insurance policy to that effect; and (3) any "other 
terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the Mayor." Id. at 753-54. 
125. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 770.
127. Id. at 772.
result of its abstract judicial review. The Constitutional Council 
cannot, in an abstract case, appreciate the broadness of the law and 
has to limit itself to challenges based on poorly drafted or intricate 
statutory requirements. Therefore, Constitutional Council cases do 
not deal with statutory vagueness challenges in the way that the 
American Supreme Court does. Nonetheless, the French quality of 
law doctrine provides an outcome that is similar to the American 
vagueness doctrine. The Council has explained, as will be discussed 
later, the constitutional requirements of intelligibility and accessibility 
as preventing citizens from arbitrary enforcement of statutes. Thus, 
even if statutory vagueness cornes in different forms, it always affects 
citizens in the same way. Both the Constitutional Council and the 
Supreme Court consider in their respective doctrines different 
sources of statutory vagueness, but they seem to reconcile them with 
similar constitutional requirements. 
C. Due Process
The American vagueness doctrine finds its root in the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 12
8 
The 
Supreme Court has held that due process implies that legislation must 
meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity. 
In Kolender, the Court wrote that the California statute required 
that "suspicious" persons satisfy some undefined identification 
requirement, or face criminal punishment. Although due process 
does not require "impossible standards" of clarity, this is not a case 
where further details in the statutory language are either impossible 
or impractical.
129 
Therefore, the statute was unconstitutionally vague 
on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to clarify what it 
contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible 
and reliable" identification.
130 
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]o persan shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State 
deprive any persan of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). 
129. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361.
130. Id. at 353. However, in Hibel v. Nevada, the Supreme Court held that defendant's
arrest for refusai to identify himself, in violation of Nevada law, did not violate his Fifth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hibel v. Nevada, 542 U.S. 
177 (2004). Quoting Kolender, the Supreme Court reminded that a statute is void when it 
provides no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it. Id. at 184. 
In Hibel, the petitioner did not allege that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court said that the Nevada statute was narrower and more 
Even if in France a Due Process Clause does not exist, due 
process as a component of the rule of law (État de droit) derives from 
several articles of the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights 
("DHCR"). Article 16 of the DHCR refers to the "guarantee of 
rights" which involves classic maxims that are protected under the 
Due Process Clause.131 Indeed, the Council bas held that Article 16 
includes the right to a fair trial.132 For example, it ruled that the 
principle of the rights of the defense and the right to effective redress 
before the Court both derive from the same article.133 
This interpretation of Article 16 of the DHCR seems to be 
analogous to the American requirement of procedural due process. 
The Constitutional Council bas not precisely invoked due process as a 
requirement for the quality of law doctrine. Still, since the Council 
has held that the principle of intelligibility of law derives also from 
Article 16 of the DHCR, which refers to the "guarantee of rights," 
one may suppose that the Constitutional Council has found in this 
article a similar requirement as the Supreme Court. Y et, the 
Constitutional Council did not explicitly explain how an unintelligible 
statute might violate the "guarantee of rights" protected under 
Article 16 of the DHCR. 
D. Retroactive Effects of Statutes
Despite the danger inherent in retroactive legislation, the
Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Congress, within constitutional 
limits, has the power to enact laws with retroactive effect. 134 In order 
precise than the California statute in Kolender. Id. at 185. Whereas the California statute 
required a suspect to give the officer "credible and reliable" identification, the Nevada 
statute, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, required that a suspect disclose his 
name. Id. at 185. Even if the Supreme Court is sometimes willing to recognize 
constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes (e.g., 
Kolender), in Hibel the Supreme Court held that officer's request to disclose suspect's 
name was commonsense inquiry and did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 185. 
131. THIERRY S. RENOUX, MICHEL DE VILLIERS, CODE CONSTITUTIONNEL,
LEXISNEXIS, Paris, 2005, at 179. 
132. CC decision no. 2004-492DC, Mar. 2, 2004, Rec. 66.
133. Id.
134. Still, both American and French constitutional laws contain a strict prohibition on
the enactment of retroactive criminal statutes. In France this prohibition derives from 
Article 8 of the DHCR. In American constitutional law this precept is reflected in Ex Post 
Facto Clause. For one applicable to Congress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and 
another applicable to state legislatures, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1). Nonetheless, it 
bas long been established, in American constitutional law, that Congress can pass statutes 
that limit a person's rights based on past criminal convictions. See generally Bugajewitz v. 
Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 608-09 (1913) (upholding a law that provided for the deportation of 
to determine the permissible retroactive effect of a statute, the 
Supreme Court provided a test in Landgraf v. US/ Film 
Productions, 
135 
whose rationale tracks vagueness issues. "The first 
step in determining whether a statute bas an impermissible 
retroactive effect is to ascertain whether Congress bas directed with 
requisite clarity that the law be applied retrospectively."
136 
As the 
Court bas written, the standard for finding such unambiguous 
direction is a demanding one. The only cases where the Supreme 
Court bas found retroactive effect adequately authorized by statute 
are cases in which the statute sustained only one interpretation. In 
INS v. St. Cyr
137 
the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General 
could not retroactively apply the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") § 304(b)
138 
since Congress 
failed for lack of clarity by not precisely requiring that the law be 
applied retrospectively .
1
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9 
In this case, a citizen of Haiti pleaded guilty in a state court to a 
charge of selling a controlled substance in violation of Connecticut 
law.
140 
This conviction made him deportable. Under pre-IIRIRA law
applicable at the time of his conviction, St. Cyr would have been 
eligible for a waiver of deportation at the discretion of Attorney 
General.
141 
However, removal proceedings against him were not
a women convicted of prostitution); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1898) 
(upholding a public health law which prohibited a person convicted of a felony from 
practicing medicine) (citing Nancy Morawetz, Determining the Retroactive Effect of Laws 
Altering the Consequences ofCriminal Convictions, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1743, 1743 (2003)). 
135. 511 u.s. 244 (1994).
136. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 315, 316 (2001) ( citing Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343,352 (1999) ).
137. Id.
138. Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
139. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315 ; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). In
this case, the Supreme Court held that Congress expressly provided that subsections (e) 
(2) and (e) (3) of section 1005 of Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, applied to pending cases. But it chose-after having been
presented with the option-not to so provide the same for subsection (e) (1). Referring to
the "negative inference" principle, the Supreme Court explained that "where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578 (quoting Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). Since the Congress did not expressly provide that
subsection (e) (1) applied to pending cases, "the omission is an integral part of the
statutory scheme that muddies whatever 'plain meaning' may be discerned from blinkered
study of subsection (e) (1) alone." Id. at 584.
140. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.
141. Id. at 315.
commenced until April 10, 1997, which is after IIRIRA became 
effective.
142 
Therefore, the Attorney General interpreted the new
legislation as depriving him of the discretion to grant such a waiver.
143 
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not precisely identify 
which set of proceedings would apply to aliens whose exclusion or 
deportation proceedings began prior to the new law's effective date.144
It added that Congress made some provisions of IIRIRA expressly 
applicable to prior convictions, but did not do so in regard to § 
304(b ). For the Supreme Court this was an indication "that Congress 
did not definitively decide the issue of § 304's retroactive application 
to pre-enactment convictions." 145 
The Supreme Court delivers in this case another approach to 
vagueness, which seems to reinforce the requirement of clearness in 
cases involving aliens. In this case, the Supreme Court, before 
analyzing the second prong of the Landgraftest, held that: 
[T]he presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous 
statutory provisions, buttressed by the longstanding principle of 
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in 
favor of aliens, forecloses the conclusion that, in enacting § 
304(b ), Congress itself has affirmatively considered the 
potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined 
that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing 
benefits.
14
6 
In France, the Constitutional Council applies the equivalent of 
"strict scrutiny" when looking at the retroactive effect of statutes. 
Under Article 8 of the DHCR "the Law must proscribe only the 
punishments that are strictly and evidently necessary; and no one may 
be punished except by virtue of a Law drawn up and promulgated 
before the offense is committed, and legally a pp lied. "
147 Therefore,
the Constitutional Council has held in many cases that the criminal 
law cannot have a retroactive effect unless it has an in mitius 
retroactive effect.
148 
The strict scrutiny of retroactive effect does not
involve an assessment on quality of law grounds as the American 
142. Id.
143. Id. at 297.
144. Id. at 320.
145. Id. (citation omitted).
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789, art. 8 (1789) (Fr.).
148. "In mitius retroactive effect" means that the new statu te is favorable to plaintiffs.
Supreme Court cases do. Nevertheless, the principle that only the 
Law defines crimes and punishments derives from Article 8 of the 
DHCR. The Constitutional Council has held that according to this 
principle the criminal law, in order to avoid arbitrary decisions, must 
define crimes and punishments in sufficiently precise terms.
149 This 
obligation emanates from Article 8 and is not a component of the 
principle of accessibility and intelligibility of the law. For the 
Constitutional Council, the clarity must be inherent to the criminal 
law. This reasoning affirms once again the Constitutional Council's 
position. The Constitutional Council fails to provide a global 
vagueness doctrine and a unique constitutional requirement. Even if 
the necessity of clarity of law appears in different cases, it is dispersed 
in multiple articles of the Constitution and does not provide a precise 
rationale. 
III. Similar Prongs for the Vagueness Test and
the Quality of Law Test 
A. Standards of 'Ordinary Intelligence' and 'Sufficient Knowledge'
Vagueness and unnecessary complexity in law breaches the core
of the rule of law since it does not protect our current expectations 
about the future legal consequences of our conduct. Indeed, the law 
has to be drafted in clear terms so that the public (i.e., people of 
ordinary intelligence) are aware of what it prohibits. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court has established a principle of "ordinary intelligence" 
in clarity to satisfy due process.150 This means that the law must 
provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence for its proscriptions. 
For the Supreme Court this prong is the first requirement for the 
vagueness test. 
The Supreme Court has written that, "because we assume that 
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist 
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair 
warning. "151 
The French Constitutional Council has adopted a similar, albeit 
less explicit, principle. It requires that the citizen should have a 
149. CC decision no. 80-127DC, Jan. 19-20, 1981, Rec. 15.
150. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613-14 (1970).
151. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
"sufficient knowledge" of laws that apply to him.152 The 
commentators of Constitutional Council's cases interpreted this 
prong as providing to the quality of law doctrine the requirement that 
derives from the Latin term of art: nemo censetur legem ignorare 
(every man is presumed to know the law).
153 
But, depending on the 
case, the Constitutional Council makes use of different approaches to 
explain the standard of "sufficient knowledge." 
In 2004, the Council held that the principle of accessibility and 
intelligibility of law implies that the law should have no double 
meaning.
154 
Therefore, the legislature should use unequivocal 
language. In some other cases the Constitutional Council replaced 
the requirement of "sufficient knowledge" by a new formulation: a 
statute must contain provisions which are "sufficiently precise and 
unequivocal."
155 
The purpose of the standard of "sufficient 
knowledge" seems to be similar to the American standard of 
"ordinary intelligence." Indeed, when the Constitutional Council 
asserts that the law should be drafted in "sufficient" clear terms, the 
adjective "sufficient" refers to the ability of an ordinary citizen to 
measure the scope of the law. 
However, the Constitutional Council has not yet precisely ruled 
whether the standard of "common understanding" is an objective 
standard or a subjective one. Scholars pointed out that the principle 
of intelligibility and accessibility of law refers to a subjective standard 
of "common understanding" since the words "intelligibility" and 
"accessibility" involve citizens' positive action towards statutes' 
meaning.
156 
But Constitutional Council cases do not furnish further 
details. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with the same issue, namely 
considering whether the standard of "ordinary intelligence" is an 
objective or a subjective standard. In Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
157 
the plaintiffs challenged an ordinance on vagueness grounds. The 
ordinance provided that it "shall be unlawful for three or more 
persans to assemble, except at a public meeting of citizens, on any 
sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to 
152. CC decision no. 99-421 DC, supra note 43.
153. Milano, supra note 41, at 641.
154. CC decision no. 2001-455DC, supra note 45.
155. Id.; see also CC decision no. 2004-503DC, Aug. 12, 2004, Rec. 144.
156. Mathieu & Verpeaux, supra note 47, at 17.
157. 402 u.s. 611.
persans passing by."
158 
The Ohio Court of Appeals explained that 
"the standard of conduct which it specifies is not dependent upon 
each complainant's sensitivity."
159 
The Supreme Court held that the 
construction put upon the ordinance by the state court was an 
unexplained conclusion since "it did not indicate upon whose 
sensitivity a violation does depend-the sensitivity of the judge or 
jury, the sensitivity of the arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a 
hypothetical reasonable man. "
160 
The Court noted that "conduct that 
annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is 
vague, not in the sense that it requires a persan to conform his 
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative conduct, but 
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."
161 
The Constitutional Council does not provide a precise definition 
of the principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law. Even if the 
standard of "sufficient knowledge" seems to be similar to the 
vagueness doctrine's first prong, the Constitutional Council does not 
always explain in its cases how a vague statute could deprive citizens 
of the rights protected under Articles 4, 5, and 16 of the DHCR. 
In sum, one can see that the standard established by the Supreme 
Court is more sophisticated than the Constitutional Council's test. 
This is because the French Constitutional Council has failed to 
provide a thorough explanation of the reasoning behind the quality of 
law doctrine. 
B. Prevention of Discriminatory and Arbitrary Decisions
According to the U .S. Supreme Court a statu te can be held
unconstitutionally vague for two independent reasons. A statute is 
vague if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits or "if it 
authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. "
162 
Therefore: 
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who
apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
158. Id at 611 n.1 (quoting Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinanœs of the City of Cincinnati (1956)).
159. Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
160. Id.
161. :d. at 614.
162. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (citation omitted).
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application. 
163 
The danger of arbitrary enforcement appears also in 
Constitutional Council's cases. In 2007, the Members of the National 
Assembly and Senators addressed a referral to the Constitutional 
Council against the Act relating to the control of immigration, 
integration and asylum.164 Section 13 of the statute required genetic 
testing for certain visa applicants in order to establish the family 
relationship between the host in France and the applicant.165 The 
parties making the referral argued that the provision of section 13 
violated both Article 34 of the Constitution and the principle of 
intelligibility and accessibility of law. 166 Indeed, they argued, the 
legislature failed to act within the scope of its powers and abdicated 
its power leaving to a decree (executive act) to draw up the list of 
countries in which the genetic testing of persons for identification 
purposes shall be introduced on an experimental basis.167 Moreover, 
they argued that Parliament did not provide sufficient legal 
protections for the genetic testing of persons.168 Therefore, this 
procedure was unintelligible. The Constitutional Council held: 
19. Parliament must exercise to the full the powers vested in it
by the Constitution and in particular by Article 34 thereof. The
full exercise of such powers, together with the object of
constitutional status that the law be intelligible and accessible,
which derives from Article 4, 5, 6 and 16 of the Declaration of
1789, place it under a duty to enact provisions which are
sufficiently precise and unequivocal. Protection must be
afforded to ail from interpretations which run counter to the
Constitution or from the risk of arbitrary decisions, without
leaving it to courts of law or administrative authorities to
determine ru/es which the Constitution provides should be the
sole p reserve of statute law 
.169 
163. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108--09 (1972) (emphasis added).
164. CC decision no. 2007-557DC, Nov. 15, 2007, Rec. 360.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id; see also CC decision no. 2006-540DC, June 27, 2006, Rec. 88 (Loi Relative aux
Droits d'Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la Société de l'Information [Act pertaining to 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society] (emphasis added)). 
ln this case, the Constitutional Council disallowed the 
petitioners' referral.
1
1
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Nevertheless, it seems to provide the same
argument as the American Supreme Court. According to the 
Constitutional Council, the quality of law doctrine requires that a 
statute should be clear enough to prevent citizens from the risk of 
arbitrary decisions. Therefore, as the Supreme Court said, the 
legislature must establish guidelines to govern law enforcement171 in 
order to protect citizens from all forms of unjust enforcement.172 
C. Intelligible Principle Doctrine
ln cases concerning the delegation of legislative power to federal
agencies (or executive power), the Supreme Court has held that when 
Congress delegates legislative power it must provide criteria­
"intelligible principles"-to guide the agency's exercise of 
discretion.
173 
Thus, vague or overly broad delegations, which lack an 
"intelligible principle" to guide the agency, may violate Separation of 
Powers principles. 
Overly broad or vague delegations of power to agencies outside 
of the legislative branch
174 
undermine the structural protections 
provided in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, such as bicameralism 
and presentment.
175 
The requirement of an "intelligible principle" in 
legislation delegating power assures that basic policy is being made by 
Congress and not by the President or private parties. 
This doctrine appeared during the New Deal period as the "non­
delegation" doctrine. Yet, the Supreme Court invalidated only two 
statutes for over-delegating legislative power. In Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan the Court held that a statute did not literally provide any 
guidance for the exercise of president's discretion.176 As a result, it 
170. See 21 LES CAHIERS OU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 13 (2006).
171. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 533, 573-74 (1974); see also Goldsmith, supra note
3, at 288-90. 
172. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U .S. 703 (2000).
173. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
319-22 (Gaithersburg ed., Aspen Publishers 2002) (1997).
174. Most administrative agencies in the U.S. reside within the Executive Branch.
Administrative agencies (les autorités administratives indépendantes) in France are new. 
They first appeared in 1978. They also reside within the Executive Branch. See LES 
AUTORITÉS ADMINISTRATIVES INDÉPENDANTES, 52 ÉTUDES ET DOCUMENTS OU 
CONSEIL D'ÉTAT ( E.D.C.E.) 2001. 
175. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House ...
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President .... "). 
176. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,415 (1934).
invalidated a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
("NIRA") that authorized the president to prohibit the shipment in 
interstate commerce of oil produced in excess of state-imposed 
production quotas. Not only was the statute an impermissible 
delegation of legislative power, but it also failed to provide any 
standard in order to limit president's discretion. In Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated another 
regulation adopted under the NIRA.
177 
The Court held that 
"Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the 
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. "
178 
The 
regulation was therefore found unconstitutional as an impermissible 
delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court admitted the 
need for regulations to deal with the "host of details with which the 
national legislature cannot deal directly"
179 
but it further explained 
that "the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such 
provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has 
been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the 
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is 
to be maintained."
180 
Although the non-delegation doctrine has not 
been overruled, in the more than seventy years since Panama 
Refining, the Court has not found a single federal law invalid on this 
basis.
181 
In Mistretta v. United States,
182 
the Court upheld the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, which, inter alia, created the United States 
Sentencing Commission as an independent body in the Judicial 
Branch with power to promulgate binding sentencing guidelines 
establishing a range of determinate sentences for all categories of 
federal offenses and defendants according to specific and detailed 
factors. The Supreme Court held that: 
In light of our approval of broad delegations, we harbor no 
doubt that Congress' delegation of authority to the Sentencing 
Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet 
constitutional requirements. Congress charged the Commission 
with three goals: to "assure the meeting of the purposes of 
177. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,551 (1935).
178. Id. at 529.
179. Id. at 530.
180. Id. ( citation omitted).
181. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 173, at 321.
182. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
sentencing as set forth" in the Act; to "provide certainty and 
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with 
similar records . . . while maintaining sufficient flexibility to 
permit individualized sentences" where appropriate; and to 
"reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowled&:ie of 
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. 
ln addition the Supreme Court said, "Congress prescribed the 
specific tool (the guidelines system) for the Commission to use in 
regulating sentencing" and "to guide the Commission in its 
formulation of offense categories."184 Therefore, the Act was 
constitutional since it "set forth more than merely an 'intelligible 
principle' or minimal standards." 185 
The Supreme Court provided the "intelligible principle" test in 
1928 as the measurement standard for the delegation of legislative 
power.
186 
In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum 
Institute,
181 
the Supreme Court included the "intelligible principle" 
within the non-delegation doctrine. lt held that: 
[T]he non-delegation doctrine serves three important functions.
First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent
with orderly governmental administration that important
choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our
Government most responsive to the popular will. Second, the
doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it
necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that
authority with an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of
the delegated discretion. Third, and derivative of the second,
the doctrine ensures that courts charged with reviewing the
exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test
that exercise against ascertainable standards.
188 
Nevertheless, even if the Supreme Court has a broad 
interpretation of the impermissible delegation of legislative power, 
the "intelligible principle" requirement seems to be the most 
183. Id. at 374 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 379.
186. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
187. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum lnst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
188. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
significant constitutional limit on congressional grants of power to 
administrative agencies. 
In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n,
189 
the Supreme Court 
held that: "Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, 
one might say, hide elephants in mouse holes."190 In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that "[i]n a delegation challenge, the 
constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated pure 
legislative power to an agency. Article 1, section 1, of the 
Constitution vests all legislative Powers herein granted ... in a 
Congress of the United States. This text permits no delegation of 
powers. "191 Therefore, the Supreme Court wrote "when Congress
confers decision making authority upon agencies Congress must lay 
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to act is directed to conform."192 
However, in that case the Supreme Court upheld section 109 of 
the Clean Air Act that instructed the Environmental Protection 
Agency to set "ambient air quality standards." The Court 
unanimously rejected the challenge to section 109 of the CAA as an 
impermissible delegation of legislative power. Justice Scalia wrote for 
the Court that the "EP A ... set air quality standards at the level that 
is requisite-that is, not lower or higher than it is necessary-to 
protect the public health with adequate margin of safety, fits 
comf ortably within the scope of discretion permitted by our 
precedent." 193 
This requirement seems to be similar to the Constitutional 
Council's principle of intelligibility of law. Both courts use the notion 
of "intelligibility." The Constitutional Council asserts that 
Parliament must set intelligible statutes in order to prevent courts of 
law or administrative authorities' interpretation of rules in order to 
avoid arbitrary decisions.194 In the same way, the Supreme Court
requires that Congress give an "intelligible principle " to guide the 
agency in its exercise of discretion. 
When looking closely at the Supreme Court's test for 
"intelligible principles," this doctrine seems to be analogous to the 
189. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
190. Id. at 472.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 476.
194. CC decision no. 2007-557DC, supra note 164.
French clarity of law principle. Even though the Constitutional 
Council renounced its clarity of law doctrine, this doctrine could still 
reappear as a separate doctrine from the principle of intelligibility 
and accessibility of law. Therefore, the comparison with the 
American intelligible principle provides a new reading of the French 
clarity of law principle. 
lndeed, on one hand, behind these two doctrines ( clarity of law 
and intelligible principle) stands the idea of the vague delegation of 
legislative power. For the Supreme Court, the intelligibility doctrine 
is a limit on insufficiently defined delegations. The Constitutional 
Council had the same reasoning since it declared that the principle of 
clarity of law derived from Article 34 of the Constitution. Under the 
French Constitution, Parliament must act within its enumerated 
powers, which are listed in Article 34 of the Constitution.
195 
The 
Government has general powers under Article 37 of the 
Constitution.
196 
Therefore, the Council held that Parliament would 
violate Article 37 of the Constitution by acting in matters not 
enumerated by Article 34 (incompétence positive).
197 
However, the 
Council has always given a very broad interpretation of matters 
enumerated by Article 34.
198 But above all the Constitutional Council 
195. 1958 CONST. art. 34 (Fr.) (Statutes should determine the mies concerning: Civic
rights and fundamental guarantees granted to citizens for the exercise of their civil 
liberties; freedom, pluralism and the independence of the media; obligations imposed for 
the purpose of national defense upon the person and property of citizens; nationality; the 
status and capacity of persans; matrimonial property system; inheritance and gifts; 
determination of serious crimes and other major offences and the penalties they carry; 
criminal procedure; amnesty; the setting up of new categories of courts and the status of 
members of the Judiciary; the base, rates and methods of collection of ail types of taxes; 
and the issuing of currency. Statutes shall also determine the mies governing: The system 
for electing members of the Houses of Parliament, local assemblies and the representative 
bodies for French nationals living abroad, as well as the condition for holding elective 
offices and positions for members of the deliberative assemblies of the territorial 
communities; the setting up of categories of public legal entities; the fundamental 
guarantees granted to civil servants and members of the Armed Forces; nationalization of 
companies and the transfer of ownership of companies from the public to the private 
sector. Statutes shall also Jay down the basic principles of: The general organization of 
national defense; the self-government of territorial communities, their powers and 
revenue; education; the preservation o f  the environment; systems of ownership, property 
rights and civil and commercial obligations; employment law, Tracte Union law and Social 
Security.). 
196. 1958 CONST. art. 37 (Fr.) (Matters other than those coming under the scope of
statute law should be matters for regulation.). 
197. CC decision no. 68-35DC, January 30, 1968, Rec. 19.
198. See LOUIS FAVOREU, Preface to JEAN BOULOUIS, LE DOMAINE DE LA LOI ET
DU RÈGLEMENT (1981). See also JÉRÔME TREMEAU, LA RESERVE DE LOI (1997). 
has held that Parliament could not delegate its power.
199 
Rather, the 
legislature itself had to create rules in those matters, which Article 34 
of the Constitution mandates should be the sole preserve of the 
statute. This reasoning is known as "incompétence negative" 
doctrine.200 
First, Parliament cannot explicitly delegate its legislative power, 
except under Article 38.
201 
Second it has to exercise the full powers 
vested in it by Article 34. This requirement is meant to avoid implicit 
delegations of legislative power.
202 
When the principle of clarity of 
law appeared, the Constitutional Council used it at the same time as 
this second aspect of the "incompétence négative" doctrine.203 When 
drafted in terms lacking sufficient clarity, a statute may encourage 
discretionary interpretation and implementation.
204 
The Council 
seems to say that if the executive has to interpret and implant a broad 
statute, this inevitably includes an implicit and thus impermissible 
delegation of legislative power.20
5 
But the Council did not explicitly describe its clarity of law 
doctrine, but rather confused it with the principle of intelligibility and 
accessibility of law.
206 
Therefore, scholars did not analyze the 
principle of clarity of law as an additional prong to the constitutional 
non-delegation requirement but as a component of the quality of law 
movement undertaken by the Council.
207 
In consequence, the U.S. 
intelligible principle doctrine provides a new understanding of the 
French clarity of law doctrine. The Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Council use similar prongs for their respective non­
delegation doctrines. 
199. CC decision no. 75-56DC, July 23, 1975, Rec. 22.
200. TREMEAU, see supra note 198.
201. See supra note 57.
202. Florence Galletti, Existe-t-il une obligation de bien légiférer? Propos sur
"l'incompétence negative du législateur dans la jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, 58 
REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL [R.F.D.C.] 387,387 (2004) (Fr.). 
203. Georges Schmitter, L'incompétence Negative du Législateur et des Autorités
Administratives, 5 ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE 
(A.I.J.C.) 387 (1989) (Fr.). 
204. See Milano, supra note 41, at 650. See also Lucienne-Victoire Fernandez­
Maublanc, Accessibilité et Intelligibilité de la Loi ou la Réhabilitation de la Loi par le 
Conseil Constitutionnel, in LA CONSTITUTION ET SES VALEURS, MELANGES EN 
L'HONNEUR DE DIMITRI-GEORGES LAVAROFF 163 (2005) (Fr.). 
205. Fernandez-Maublanc, supra note 204, at 168.
206. Milano, supra note 41, at 650.
207. See, e.g., Daniel Chamussy, Le Conseil Constitituionnel et la Qualité de la
Législation, REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 1037 (2004) (Fr.). 
On the other hand, the U.S. intelligible principle doctrine and 
French clarity of law doctrine seem to affirm that statutes should be 
self-contained. The "incompleteness" of a statute raises another 
vagueness question. "Incompleteness" is "ordinarily a feature of 
explanations, reports, descriptions, and so on."
208 
For both the U.S.
Supreme Court and Constitutional Council, this form of vagueness is 
tightly linked to, even if not expressly affirmed by, the principle of 
separation of powers since it stands behind the non-delegation 
doctrine. The impermissible delegation of legislative power is a 
violation of the principle of separation of powers since it leads to a 
concentration of powers. A lack of clarity can generate an implicit 
delegation of legislative power and in consequence violate the core of 
the principle of separation of powers under the French constitution.
209 
The law should, therefore, reflect in its wording that the principle of 
separation of powers has been respected. 
Yet, the U.S. intelligible principle doctrine cannot be fully 
understood without examining some other cases in which the 
Supreme Court was asked to examine the constitutionality of agency 
regulations. In these cases the Court sought to find whether Congress 
provided an unambiguous delegation to federal agencies. 
In Chevron v. NRDC,
2
10 the Supreme Court held: 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.211
If not, the second question for the Court is whether the agency's 
interpretation of its delegated powers is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. In Chevron, the Supreme Court ruled 
. that EPA's decision to allow States to treat all pollution-emitting 
devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were 
encased within a single "bubble" is a permissible construction of the 
statute "which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air 
208. ENDICOIT, supra note 1, at 38.
209. Milano, supra note 41, at 641.
210. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
211. Id. at 842-43.
pollution with economic growth. "
212 
On the first prong, the Court 
held that Congress did not precisely determine the meaning of the 
"stationary source" that the Agency had to regulate.213 Thus, under
Chevron's second step, the Court deferred to the agency's 
determination under the statute. 
Therefore, an ambiguous statute is not necessarily 
unconstitutional, and federal agencies' regulations remain valid if 
based on permissible constructions of the statute. Yet, ambiguity is 
another interesting aspect of poorly drafted statutes. Ambiguity is 
somewhat different from vagueness. A vague word "has one meaning 
(and its application is unclear in some cases)" whereas an ambiguous 
word "has more than one meaning (and it may be unclear, in some 
cases, which is in use)."
214 The Supreme Court provides this
distinction even if ambiguous statutes, as we have seen above, are 
valid for constitutional purposes. The Constitutional Council does 
not seem to make this distinction in its cases as it uses "ambiguous" as 
synonymous with "imprecise."
215 
And yet, imprecision is a vagueness
problem. Timothy Endicott explains that "imprecision is the 
typifying feature of words that are vague in the broad sense. "
216 
Therefore, the Council has failed to distinguish "ambiguity "from 
'unintelligibility."'217 It uses these two notions together, wi.thin the 
principle of intelligibility and accessibility of law.
218 
D. The Foreseeable Nature of the Law
The Constitutional Council has not exactly defined the
foreseeable nature of the law as a component of the quality of law 
doctrine, but some commentators have read this additional prong into 
the Constitutional Council's cases.
219 
The foreseeable nature of the law is an argument used by the 
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"). According to 
European judges: 
212. Id. at 866.
213. Id. at 860-62.
214. ENDICOTI, supra note 1, at 30.
215. CC decision no. 2003-475DC, supra note 65.
216. ENDICOTI, supra note 1, at 33.
217. See CC decision no. 2003-475DC, supra note 65.
218. Id.
219. See Milano, supra note 41, at 640.
First ... the citizen must be able to have an indication that is 
adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" 
unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the 
citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able-if need be with 
appropriate advice-to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with 
absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. 
Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its 
train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace 
with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are 
inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent 
are vague and whose interpretation and application are 
• 
f 
• 220 
questions o practlce.
As it usually does, the ECHR sets in the same paragraph the 
principle and its limits. Here, the principle of the foreseeable nature 
of the law is a requirement that permits the Court, in the same way 
that the U.S. Supreme Court does, to define a useful prong in order to 
protect citizens' rights from vague laws.
221
One will not be surprised to find in ECHR cases a direct 
influence from the Supreme Court's vagueness test. Even if the 
Supreme Court does not use the same formulation, the purpose of the 
foreseeable nature of the law and the purpose of the first prong of 
vagueness test seem to be very close. The citizen for both ECHR and 
Supreme Court must be able to regulate his conduct. 
The Constitutional Council does not use in its cases the 
foreseeable nature of the law as an argument. Nevertheless, the 
"sufficient knowledge" that the law must provide to the citizens 
seems also to carry with it the principle of the foreseeable nature of 
the law. Thus, in 2005, in a case in which the constitutionality of the 
Finance Act was challenged, the Constitutional Council wrote that 
the citizen should be able to foresee to a reasonable degree 
(prévisibilité raisonnable) the amount of tax according to different 
options that the statute opens to him.
222 
Using different wording than the Supreme Court, the ECHR and 
the Constitutional Council look to communicate a similar principle. 
220. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245,271 (1979-80).
221. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1970); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 108--09 (1972). 
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In their theoretical constructions, these three courts seek to endow 
the citizen with a new argument against the infringement of his rights. 
But, where the Supreme Court and the ECHR bath provide a 
clear vagueness doctrine, the Constitutional Council fails to do so. 
Indisputably, the reason of the doctrinal void that the Constitutional 
Council has left is due to the abstract nature of its judicial review. 
Perhaps if the Council could hear concrete cases, it would have 
greater opportunity to develop its quality of law doctrines, perhaps 
even borrowing vagueness principles from the Supreme Court. 
The several types of vagueness we have explored in this paper 
(i.e., ambiguity, complexity, accessibility, delegation) are often better 
suited to concrete cases than to abstract a priori judicial review. In a 
sense, vagueness is hard to determine with vague facts. As a result, 
vagueness challenges brought before a challenged law is enforced 
may be found to be unripe for review in Article III courts.223 Indeed, 
lower courts in the United States have interpreted the Supreme Court 
to suggest that "outside the domain of the first amendment, 
vagueness challenges must be assessed 'as applied."'
224 
On a like 
theory, the Constitutional Council's hesitation to fully develop a 
vagueness doctrine within its limited jurisdiction of a priori review is 
quite understandable. However, that may be now changing. 
E. Raising a New Quality of Law Doctrine Through the Procedure of
'Question Préjudicielle'
In summer 2008, the French Constitution was amended in order
to grant to citizens the right of referral to the Constitutional Council. 
Among the other amendments of the Constitution that the 
Government achieved to pass that summer, the new process of 
"question préjudicielle" ("preliminary question") is indisputably the 
most important.
225 
An institutional act has to be adopted before we 
223. See, e.g., Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591, 593 (8th Cir. 2009); Nova Health Sys.
v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). See also NRA of Am. v. 
Magaw, 132 F.3d 272,291 (6th Cir. 1997). 
225. New article 61-1 reads:
If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a 
legislative provision infringes the rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the 
Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil d'Etat or by the Cour de 
Cassation to the Constitutional Council which shall rule within a determined 
period . . .  An institutional Act shall determine the conditions for the application 
of the present article. 
really know how this new procedure will be applied, but we can 
already presume that the quality of law doctrine more and more 
closely resembles the vagueness doctrine.226 
The "preliminary question" is a procedure that permits a citizen, 
whose rights are infringed, to challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute before the court.
221 
The ordinary judge in front of whom the 
constitutional issue is raised has to surseoir à statuer (stay the 
proceedings), draw up the preliminary question, and send it to the 
Constitutional Council.
228 
The latter will control the constitutionality 
of this statute and provide an answer to this question in order to 
permit the ordinary judge to resolve the case.
229 This procedure is 
roughly analogous to the procedure of "certified question" in the 
United States230 and certification by national courts in the European 
Court of Justice.
231 
The preliminary question introduces an element of concrete 
judicial review in the French system by granting the right of referral 
to the appellate and administrative courts. This new procedure will 
enable the Constitutional Council, if future plaintiffs challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute on the grounds of the quality of law 
doctrine, to assess the vagueness of a statute in a concrete case. This 
new procedure may very well oblige the Constitutional Council to fill 
the doctrinal void it has left in the past. 
Conclusion 
The lack of a concrete judicial review in France leaves the 
Constitutional Council far behind the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
quality of law doctrine compared to the vagueness doctrine seems to 
be itself vague and ambiguous. The abstract review does not permit 
the French Constitutional Council to deal with "cases and 
2008 CONST. art. 61-1 (Fr.). 
226. Sorne Articles of the French Constitution are not self-executing. Thus,
Institutional Acts have to be adopted. This is the case for Article 61-1 of the Constitution. 
227. Hugues Portelli, Rapport, fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles,
de legislation, du suffrage universel, du Réglement de l'administration générale sur le 
projet de loi organique, adopté par l'Assemblée Nationale, relatif à l'application de 
l'article 61-1 de la Constitution, no. 637, Sep. 29, 2009. 
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Certification to federal court is a method of taking case from U.S. Courts of
Appeals to Supreme Court in which former court may certify any question of law in any 
civil or criminal case as to which instructions are requested. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006). 
231. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, J.O (C 340) 234.
controversies," and therefore to measure vagueness challenges in a 
concrete case.232 The U.S. Supreme Court since 1875 has developed a 
tangible and logic-based scrutiny for its vagueness doctrine. 
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court's vagueness doctrine may help 
Congress with statutory drafting. That is not the case in France. The 
lack of a clear explanation for such decisions made by the French 
Constitutional Council has led to confusion in the legal world, both 
among practitioners and academics. 
Therefore, the new procedure of "preliminary question" seems 
to be the right occasion for the Constitutional Council to build a 
stronger reasoning for the quality of law doctrine. The U.S. Supreme 
Court's vagueness doctrine may provide much-needed guidance to 
the Council. 
232. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 864--65 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 530 U.S. 1271; Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
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